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In the six South Carolina Supreme Court decisions
handed down during the past year dealing with the various
coverages found in automobile policies the court was con-
cerned with problems in two general categories. Though
deciding issues in narrow areas, the court was confronted
with diverse situations in which insurers were asserting can-
cellations or avoidances of policies; and, cases in which in-
surers were contesting the extent of liability under particular
coverage clauses.
A. Cancellation and Avoidance
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Smoak,' the circuit
court had in effect directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff-
respondent Allstate by finding an oral binder of liability in-
surance effective, thus allowing Allstate to avoid payment
under the uninsured motorist provisions of its policy issued
to Smoak. On July 24, 1964, Smoak was involved in a col-
lision with a vehicle owned by William Seabrook, doing busi-
ness as Seabrook Transfer and Storage Co. Smoak later filed
suit and, believing Seabrook to be uninsured, had a copy of
the suit papers served on Allstate Insurance Company.2 All-
state brought this action, asserting that Carolina Casualty
Insurance Co., through an oral binder of an agent (Martens),
did provide coverge to Seabrook on the date in question. It
should be noted here that the "agent" in question was not an
employee of Carolina Casualty but was seeking on Seabrook's
behalf to find a company that would insure Seabrook.
The pivotal question in the case on appeal was whether
the trial judge erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the
insurance "agent" was acting in a capacity which would per-
mit liability for his acts to be imputed to Carolina Casualty.3
1. 256 S.C. 382, 182 S.E2d 749 (1971).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §46-750.33 (Supp. 1971) provides:
No action shall be brought under the uninsured motorist pro-
vision unless copies of the pleadings in the action establishing such
liability are served in the manner provided by law upon the in-
surance carrier writing such uninsured motorist provision.
3. The lower court relied on its interpretation of S.C. CODE ANN. §37-233
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The supreme court, in reversing, found error in two pri-
mary respects. First of all, the court indicated that even if
the applicable statute made Martens the agent of Carolina
Casualty, a jury question remained to determine whether
Martens had acted within the scope of his authority in mak-
ing the alleged oral binder. 4 The court then strengthened its
reversal by considering whether Martens might be classified
as a broker rather than an agent of the company. It found
decisions of other states in harmony with a prior South Caro-
lina case and again concluded, on the facts, that error existed
when the lower court decided, as a matter of law, that Martens
was agent for Carolina Casualty.5 The opinion of the court
reflects the many difficulties encountered in laying down
rules relative to alleged principal-agent relationships in the
insurance field. Each case arises from facts rarely analogous
to other cases. Consequently, it is virtually impossible for the
court to do other than enunciate broad principles from which
reasoned judgments may be drawn in each particular situa-
tion. To do otherwise would only create a burdensome con-
fusion in the area.
Lack of specific guidelines was not the problem in Na-
tional Service Fire Insurance Co. v. Jordan.6 In this case the
court applied the clear language of the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act 7 to require a company to provide liability
coverage for a collision that occurred on December 22, 1964,
despite the fact that the vehicle originally insured under the
policy had been disposed of and the policy allegedly cancelled
at the insured's request on or about April 30, 1963.
Although facts existed that would evoke sympathy for
the insurer's position, the statute clearly required the result
set out in the court's decision. In July, 1962, Junior Chestley
4. 182 S.E.2d at 753, relying on Cook v. Canal Ins. Co., 245 S.C. 238, 140
S.E,2d 166 (1965); and Cauthen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 189 S.C. 356,
1 S.E.2d 147 (1939).
5. The prior case of Cook v. Canal Ins. Co., spra n.4, provided the neces-
sary local authority along with Tri-City Transp. Co. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp.,
311 Ill.App. 610, 37 N.E.2d 441 (1941) ; Reserve Ins. Co. v. Duckett, 240 Md.
591, 214 A.2d 754 (1965) ; Kelly v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 237 Or.
443, 391 P.2d 770 (1964); and Monast v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 32 R.I.
557, 79 A.932 (1911). But, cf. Hahn v. Carolina Cas. Co., 252 S.C. 518, 167
S.E.2d 420 (1969).
6. 187 S.E.2d 230 (S.C. 1972).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. §§46-701 to 750.72 (Supp. 1972).
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Larrimore's driver's license was suspended. Prior to the res-
toration of the license Larrimore, by statute," was required
to file proof of financial responsibility with the Highway
Department. In December, 1962, Larrimore's wife obtained
a liability insurance policy from Canal Insurance Co., show-
ing Larrimore as a driver, that was properly certified to the
Department via SR-22 sent by Canal. Due to confusion in the
Highway Department records Larrimore was notified, with
a copy to Canal, that certification was unnecessary. The De-
partment later found its error, but noting the SR-22 filed by
Canal, took no further action. In April the insured vehicle
was sold and Canal cancelled the policy, refunding unearned
premium to Mrs. Larrimore. Canal failed, however, to notify
the Highway Department of the cancellation as required by
the Act.9 No other liability policy was available to Larrimore
on December 22, 1964.
On that date Larrimore was driving a borrowed vehicle
on which the owner had no insurance. As a result of the col-
lision Jordan, a passenger, was killed. Mrs. Jordan sought
recovery from National Service Fire under the uninsured
motorist provision of a policy issued to the Jordans. 10 National
Service Fire protested by an action for declaratory judgment,
asserting Canal's alleged failure to properly cancel the certi-
fied policy. Both the circuit court and the supreme court
agreed with National Service Fire as previously indicated.
In striking down the attempted cancellation, the court stated:
The statute placed the burden upon the insurer to give notice that
a policy previously certified will be cancelled or terminated and, in
the absence of compliance therewith, continuous coverage is afforded
the insured.11
8. S.C. CoDE ANN. §46-744 (Supp. 1971).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. §46-702(7) (h) (Supp. 1971) provides:
When an insurance carrier has certified a motor vehicle liability
policy ... the insurance so certified shall not be cancelled or
terminated until at least ten days after a notice of cancellation
or termination of the insurance certified shall be filed with the
Department, ....
10. Uninsured motorist coverage generally provides for recovery by the
named insured and members of his household of damages occasioned by the
negligence of an uninsured motorist even when the insured is a passenger in a
non-owned vehicle, provided similar coverage is not available on the vehicle
in which he is riding.
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,Canal also proposed the argument that since Larrimore
was operating a non-owned automobile not described in the
certified policy, any coverage extended must be termed volun-
tary and outside the notification requirements of the Act.
The court concluded:
The person whose license has been suspended and is about to be
restored, not any particular automobile, is regarded as the potential
hazard to the general public. He is required to give and thereafter
maintain proof of financial responsibility and a policy which afforded
coverage with respect to only one vehicle . . . would not afford "proof
of financial responsibility" as that term is defined in the statute.
12
A totally different problem of notification was resolved
by the court in Factory Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v.
Kennedy.18 In this case, Factory Mutual sought to avoid de-
fense and indemnification of its policyholder, Kennedy, in an
action arising out of a collision which occurred on February
18, 1966. The company alleged it received no notice of the
collision until July 29, 1967, at a time when a suit against
Kennedy was in default. The court below agreed with Factory
Mutual's contention that late notice of a collision or suit was
sufficient to avoid the company's usual obligations irrespec-
tive of whether the company's position in the matter had been
prejudiced. The supreme court, in reversing, clarified its posi-
tion in this area by stating:
[Wie think the sound rule to be that, in an action affecting the rights
of innocent third parties under an automobile liability policy, the
noncompliance by the insured with policy provisions as to notice and
forwarding suit papers will not bar recovery, unless the insurer shows
that the failure to give such notice has resulted in substantial prejudice
to its rights.14
The requirement that the company prove "substantial
prejudice" resulting from noncompliance with this policy
condition will undoubtedly discourage much litigation in this
area even though the lower limit of the term "substantial"
is yet to be defined.
12. Id. at 233, citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§4-702(13), -748 (1962).
13. 256 S.E. 376, 182 S.E2d 727 (1971).
14. Id. at 381, 182 S.E.2d at 729-30. The court relied on prior similar state-
ments in Squires v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 58, 145 S.E.2d
673 (1965), but apparently has enunciated the rule as specifically applying to
the notice clause for the first time in Factory Mutual (emphasis added).
[Vol. 24
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B. Extent of Insurer's Liability
In a brief, decisive opinion the court, on first impression,
has rejected one approach to "stacking limits" of uninsured
motorist and medical payments coverages. The facts giving
rise to the dispute in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Bair15 are as follows: Nationwide issued a policy to J. Harold
Bair on which two automobiles were listed as "Described auto-
mobile" providing uninsured motorist protection limits of
$10,000.00 per person and $20,000.00 per occurrence on each
automobile. The same policy also provided medical payments
coverage limits of $500.00 per person, per occurrence, on each
automobile. On July 6, 1968, one of the covered automobiles
was involved in a collision with an uninsured motorist result-
ing in three injuries and three deaths in the Bair automobile.
Nationwide filed this action for declaratory judgment, assert-
ing that its maximum exposure was $20,000.00 under the
uninsured motorist provisions of the policy and $500.00 per
person under the medical payments provision. Bair, et al.,
contended that the limits of Nationwide's responsibility
should be doubled since two cars were covered under the pol-
icy. In the circuit court Nationwide prevailed in its argu-
ments related to the uninsured motorist coverage. Bair, et a.,
prevailed on the medical payments issues.
In applying the applicable statutes16 the supreme court
could find no support for the contention that Nationwide's
obligation under the uninsured motorist coverage exceeded
$20,000.00, concluding:
We hold that Section 46-750.33 does not require uninsured motorist
endorsement limits to be multiplied by the number of vehicles insured
under the policy of which the endorsement forms a part.17
Whether the court's position on "stacking" uninsured motorist
limits will extend to other situations arising under this cov-
erage remains to be explored.' 8
15. 186 S.E2d 410 (S.C. 1972).
16. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§46-750.32, 750.33 (Supp. 1971).
17. 186 S.E.2d at 412.
18. Using the facts of this case, it will be recalled there were five pas-
sengers in Bair's automobile. It is conceivable that each of these people owned
automobiles on which similar coverage had been purchased. Uninsured motorist
protection routinely follows its named insured wherever he might be situated
when injured by an uninsured motorist (with some limitations). The question
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The court similarly found no support for requiring Na-
tionwide to pay more than $500.00 per person under the med-
ical payments coverage. Resorting to the particular policy
language involved, the court found the $500.00 limitation
"plain and unambiguous."' 19
In Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.20 the ef-
ficacy of an endorsement adding subrogation rights to a
"family compensation" 21 provision in an auto policy was dis-
puted. On March 20, 1968, appellant Nationwide issued a
properly countersigned policy containing these benefits, minus
the subrogation. On June 20, 1969, the company issued an
uncountersigned endorsement subrogating itself to its policy-
holder's rights in the event of a loss. On March 18, 1970,
policyholder Martin lost his life in a motor vehicle collision.
Subsequently, representatives of the tort-feasor entered into
a settlement agreement with Martin's estate and releases were
executed. Nationwide then refused to pay the "family com-
pensation" benefits, claiming the prior settlement and execu-
tion of releases had conclusively prejudiced its subrogation
rights. The lower court found the endorsement to be ineffec-
tive for lack of countersigning 22 and awarded the proceeds
to respondent Martin.
or death, irrespective of whether the host driver had similar coverage available.
Three options would be available to the court. First, if the host driver's cov-
erage, by virtue of a multiplicity of claims, failed to make the minimum of
$10,000.00 available to the passenger, the court could allow the passenger's
policy to provide the difference. Secondly, the court could require the passen-
ger's policy to provide its full limit regardless of the coverage provided by the
host driver's policy. Or, thirdly, the court could refuse to require the passen-
ger's policy to apply. See generally Sellers v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 185 So2d
689 (Fla. 1966); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710, 177
S.E.2d 257 (1970); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Williams, 119 Ga.App. 414, 167
S.E.2d 174 (1969); Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897,
140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
19. 186 S.E.2d at 413.
20. 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.E.2d 451 (1971).
21. This provision allowed a recovery of $5,000.00 for accidental death
resulting from motor vehicle accidents as well as a maximum of $5,000.00
medical benefits if injury or death resulted from the same cause.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. §37-247 (1962) provides, in part:
All business done in this State by insurance companies . . . shall
be transacted by their regularly authorized agents ... and all
policies, except life insurance policies, so issued must be per-
sonally countersigned by such agents.
6
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The supreme court, reversing, found the statutory re-
quirement of countersigning of the policy had been met and
could find no language requiring endorsements to be counter-
signed. No statutory language revealed a legislative intent to
require such a procedure. Or, even if such was the intent of
the legislature, the court could find no authority under which
the endorsement could be voided, noting that failure to com-
ply with the statute only subjected the company to penalty.23
In Vann v. Nationwide Insurance Co.2 4 a disgruntled
claimant under the medical payments and uninsured motorist
coverages of a Nationwide policy brought suit for actual and
punitive damages resulting from an alleged breach of the
insurance contract said to have been accomplished with a
fraudulent intention, accompanied by a fraudulent act. In
short, Vann alleged he had incurred covered medical expenses
that Nationwide refused to pay unless he would, at the same
time, agree to a compromise of his uninsured motorist claim.
Nationwide moved to strike the allegations of fraud upon
which the claim for punitive damages was based. The circuit
court granted the motion and Vann appealed.
In affirming, the supreme court first pointed out
. that a mere violation of a contract will not support an
allegation of fraud."25 Further, "[p]unitive damages are not
recoverable for the mere failure or refusal to pay a debt." 26
Nor could the court find any change of position by Vann or
any act by Nationwide which could have prevented Vann
from recovering his actual damages. As the court stated:
[T]he complaint is devoid of any allegation of fact which shows a
fraudulent act on the part of the respondent accompanying the alleged
breach of the contract .... 27
23. 256 S.C. at 581, 183 S.E.2d at 453, citing S.C. CODE ANN. §37-248
(1962).
24. 257 S.C. 217, 185 S.E.2d 363 (1971).
25. Id. at 220, 185 S.E.2d at 364, citing Calder v. Commercial Cas. Ins.
Co., 182 S.C. 240, 188 S.E. 864 (1936).
26. Id. at 221, 185 S.E. 2d at 364, citing Patterson v. Capitol Life & Health
Ins. Co., 228 S.C. 297, 89 S.E.2d 723 (1955).
27. Id. at 222, 185 S.E.2d at 365, citing Blackman v. Ind. Life & Acc. Ins.
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II. ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANCE
In an important decision construing an "anti-duplication
provision" 28 in a group major medical policy, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court has severely restricted the application of
such clauses. In Milistead v. Life Insurance Company of Vir-
g1nia,2 9 the plaintiff protested the application of such pro-
vision to his medical expenses by the defendant.
Mr. Millstead was the victim of a lengthy and expensive
illness which he alleged fell within the terms of a group health
policy issued by the defendant and procured by his employer.
The same illness, or the expense therefrom, was also allegedly
covered under another group health policy issued to Mill-
stead's wife, procured by her employer. Life of Virginia's pro-
vision deducted:
. . . all payments made to or on behalf of the insured individual for
medical care or services ... under any group . .. or other service
prepayment plan ... arranged through any employer .. 30
In the circuit court the defendant's position prevailed by
virtue of the court's interpretation of the phrase "any em-
ployer" as including the employer of Mrs. Millstead.
In reversing, the supreme court found it unnecessary to
consider whether "any employer" was the crucial phrase in
the clause. It noted that the clause was operative only when
payment was "made to or on behalf of the insured individual."
Looking to the stipulated facts, the court saw that the group
insurer had paid Mrs. Millstead based on the bills she had
submitted from her husband's illness and noted that, once
paid, she could use the money as she saw fit. The fact that
she paid medical bills for her husband was considered imna-
terial. "Payment of her husband's medical bills by the wife
with her money did not constitute payments to or on behalf
of the husband under any insurance plan."31
28. Group accident and health policies, and frequently private plans, often
include "anti-duplication" or "coordination of benefits" which restrict the policy
pay-out to medical expenses for which coverage is not provided by other poli-
cies. The companies rationalize that such provisions prevent the public from
"making money" from illnesses by the purchase of multiple policies. Of course,
in addition to serving that end, such provisions decrease the loss payments of
the companies.
29. 256 S.C. 449, 182 S.E.2d 867 (1971).
30. Id. at 451, 182 S.E2d at 868.
31. Id. at 452, 182 S.E.2d at 868.
[Vol. 24
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Whether particular "war risk" exclusions were to pre-
vent recovery by the beneficiaries for the death of a son in
Vietnam was the issue in Hazle v. Liberty Life Insurance Co.
82
Bruce Hazle, son of the plaintiffs, was accidentally shot and
killed in a supply room in a combat zone in Vietnam by an-
other soldier who was cleaning a gun. The defendant company
refused to pay under an accidental death policy and denied
double indemnity under a life insurance policy.
The circuit court, in awarding judgment for plaintiffs,
stated: ". . . military service wartime exclusions must be
construed as applicable only to death from increased hazards
related to wartime military service."3 3 Since this statement
went unchallenged by the defendant, as the supreme court
says, "that declaration is the law of this case."' 34 The negative
implication is that the declaration by the trial judge may
have been error. If so, the holding in this case should be nar-
rowly viewed and approached with caution in other cases.
Since the specific clause in question was not reprinted in the
supreme court's opinion, no judgment can be formed on
whether the exclusion depended only on the status of the in-
sured or whether it was a "result" clause, requiring the
increased hazard and causal connection mentioned by the
court. Both type clauses are written and are effective within
their proper ambit.35
IV. LICENSE FEES AND TAXES
The battle of United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v.
City of Newberry36 continues. Newberry enacted a city license
tax on the gross receipts of fire and casualty companies doing
business within its confines. 37 In the lower court the company,
in seeking a summary judgment, claimed the tax, as imposed,
was unreasonable and a burden upon it. The city did not op-
32. 186 S.E.2d 245 (S.C. 1972).
33. Id. at 246.
34. Id.
35. Compare McQueen v. Sovereign Camp W.O.W., 115 S.C. 411, 106,
S.E. 32 (1921) with Young v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 204 S.C. 386, 29
S.E.2d 482 (1944).
36. 186 S.E2d 239 (S.C. 1972). See also, U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. City of
Newberry, 253 S.C. 197, 169 S.E.2d 599 (1969).




Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
pose the motion and it was granted. The city then appealed.
After a thorough consideration of the constitutionality of the
tax from both a state and federal perspective, the court
viewed the proceeding below and concluded that the record
was inadequate in respects of the city's opposition to the mo-
tion. The court also considered the case one of "grave public
importance" which deserved a full evidentiary hearing to
give the city ". . . an opportunity upon trial to justify, if
it can, the classification and rate of tax as being constitution-
ally permissible."38 The result, though procedurally unusual,3 9
could easily be characterized as judicial restraint at its best.
It would seem that monumental issues are best decided upon
all the evidence.
In State v. Pilot Life Insurance Co.40 the court was called
upon to determine whether certain investments made by Pilot
Life were property applied by that company as credits against
the state graded license fee. In affirming, the court adopted
the exhaustive opinion of the lower court as its judgment of
the issues. At the risk of substantial oversimplification, the
result may be summarized as:
(1) allowing insurance companies to reduce graded li-
cense fees when investments are made in "first mortgage
bonds of real estate in this state" 41 regardless of the identity
of the owner ;42 and
(2) disallowing credit against the fee for investments
in collateral loans, even though the collateral is a note se-
cured by a first mortgage on South Carolina realty.43
D. A. BROWN
38. 186 S.E.2d at 243.
39. The court found no error in the lower court and did not expressly
reverse the trial judge, but carefully remanded the case for further proceedings.
40. 257 S.C. 383, 186 S.E2d 262 (1972).
41. S.C. CODE Axx. §37-123 (1962).
42. 257 S.C. at 398, 186 S.E2d at 270.
43. Id. at 400, 186 S.C. at 271.
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